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Abstract
I develop a model of public sector contracting based on the multitask framework
by Holmstr￿m and Milgrom (1991). In this model, an agent can put e⁄ort into
increasing the quality of a service or reducing costs. Being residual claimants,
private owners have stronger incentives to cut costs than public employees. However,
if quality cannot be perfectly measured, providing a private ￿rm with incentives to
improve quality forces the owner of the ￿rm to bear risk. As a result, private ￿rms
will always be cheaper for low levels of quality but might be more expensive for high
levels of quality. Extending the model to allow for di⁄erences in task attractiveness,
I ￿nd that public ￿rms shun unattractive tasks, whereas private ￿rms undertake
them if incentives are strong enough.
Keywords: Privatization, public sector contracting, incomplete contracts, con-
tracting out.
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Governments often procure services, such as garbage collection or elderly care, from pri-
vate ￿rms. A central issue in the debate on the merits of privatization has been how
private and public ￿rms di⁄er regarding quality and cost. The standard view of economic
theory is that private ￿rms are cheaper than public ￿rms, but that they might shirk on
quality provision (Hart, Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Shleifer 1998). In this paper, I develop
a model of privatization that combines the multitask framework by Holmstr￿m and Mil-
grom (1991) with incomplete contracts.1 My main result is that private ￿rms are cheaper
for low levels of quality, but that they might be more expensive for high levels of quality
when quality is measured imperfectly.
As shown by Sappington and Stiglitz (1987), ownership matters only if contracts are
incomplete. If it were possible to write complete contracts, taking every contingency over
the entire horizon of the ￿rm into account, the government could provide a private and a
public ￿rm with exactly the same incentives. Many models of incomplete contracting build
on Grossman and Hart (1986), who assume that ownership allocates residual control rights
that in￿ uence bargaining power in later stages of a contractual relationship. Notably,
Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) assume that an owner of a private ￿rm has a stronger
bargaining position toward the government than a manager of a public ￿rm. Therefore,
the private provider has stronger incentives to implement innovations that improve quality
or reduce costs. However, the private provider￿ s incentives to cut costs might be too strong
since he ignores any negative e⁄ects on quality that the cost reduction might entail. As a
result, private provision will always be cheaper than public provision, but may be either
superior or inferior in terms of quality.
A distinguishing feature of Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) is that ex ante contracts
are the same under private and public provision. This view contrasts with the extensive
use of procurement agencies in developed economies. Whereas explicit contracts are
scarce under public provision, privatization in service contracting seems to go hand in
hand with extensive ex ante contracting. In this paper, I take the view that there is
some scope for ex ante contracting on quality with private providers, but not with public
providers. The basic di⁄erence between the view of Grossman and Hart (1986) and this
1The model could also be thought of as a general model of contracting out, applicable to the make-or-
buy decision of private ￿rms. Yet in this paper we will restrict our discussion to the case of privatization.
1paper is that whereas they distinguish between the ownership of assets and contractual
compensation, I assume that integration shrinks the set of feasible compensation contracts.
If the government holds the residual control rights, contracts on pro￿t sharing or rewards
for the completion of tasks could be manipulated ex post. Hence, like Schmidt (1996),
I view privatization as a commitment device of the government that resolves a time-
inconsistency problem.2
The agent in my model can invest e⁄ort in improving service quality or reducing costs.
Because of the commitment problem, employees of public ￿rms cannot be given strong
incentives to engage in either of these tasks, implying that work e⁄ort is low but balanced
between quality improvements and cost reductions. In contrast, owners of private ￿rms
always have strong incentives to cut costs and must be provided with ￿nancial incentives
for quality provision in order to improve quality. As a result, when only weak incentives
are feasible, the maximum level of quality is higher under public provision than under
private provision. On the other hand, if strong incentives are feasible, the maximum level
of quality is higher under private provision.
Although it is possible to contract on quality outcomes with a private provider, out-
comes may only partly re￿ ect e⁄ort. When this is the case, providing a private ￿rm with
incentives to improve quality will force the owner of the ￿rm to bear risk, raising the
price for a given level of quality. Public employees are insensitive to such measurement
problems since they are paid a ￿xed wage regardless of the outcome. If owners of private
￿rms are su¢ ciently risk averse, private ￿rms are more expensive than public ￿rms for
high levels of quality, even though they operate more e¢ ciently. I thus identify a potential
non-monotonicity regarding the choice of ownership structure in government preference
for quality: If strong incentives for quality are feasible, but e⁄ort on quality is hard to
measure, private provision is preferable when quality is considered either unimportant
or very important whereas public provision is optimal when quality is of intermediate
importance. This result di⁄ers from the prediction of Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997)
that private provision is always cheaper.
Though this paper focus on the cost of risk, the main argument of the paper ￿that
private ￿rms are cheaper for low levels of quality but may be more expensive for high
2La⁄ont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 17) make a similar assumption about commitment problems under
public provision: "Since the investment and its bene￿ts are not contractible, the government cannot
commit not to expropriate the manager￿ s investment in order to maximize ex post public use of the
investment" (p. 645).
2levels of quality ￿holds as long as there is some signi￿cant cost of providing private ￿rms
with strong incentives for quality. Such costs could also arise if contracting itself is costly
or because of limited liability.
The model￿ s predictions ￿t well with the empirical evidence on service contracting.
There is substantial evidence that privatization reduces costs without a detrimental e⁄ect
on quality for services such as refuse collection and cleaning services, where measurability
of quality can be assumed to be good.3 In contrast, privatization of a more complex
service like hospital care has not been shown to reduce costs in general.
Empirical evidence also supports the selection of services for privatization implied by
the model. In a comprehensive study on service contracting in American cities, Levin and
Tadelis (2007) ￿nd that services for which it is harder to write and administer performance
contracts are less likely to be privatized. Further, services that city managers rank lower
in terms of resident sensitivity to quality are more likely to be bought from private ￿rms.
This paper di⁄ers from most previous theoretical papers on privatization, like La⁄ont
and Tirole (1993) and Schmidt (1996), in its emphasize on quality issues.4 However, this
paper is not the ￿rst to argue that costs of providing private ￿rms with incentives for
quality is important in public sector contracting. For example, Donahue (1989, p. 87
and p. 105) and Sclar (2000, p. 109) both argue that the inability to accurately measure
e⁄ort on quality may lead to an suboptimal allocation of risk under private provision.
Levin and Tadelis (2007) develop a model of service contracting that is similar to mine
in the sense that they focus on the cost of contracting on quality under private provision,
though their setup is quite di⁄erent and they do not consider risk.
I present the model in the next section, and the main results are laid out in Section
3. In Section 4, I discuss some extensions of the basic model. Allowing for contracting on
cost, I ￿nd that although contracts are complete in the sense that a private ￿rm can be
provided with exactly the same incentives as a public ￿rm, ownership still matters. If e⁄ort
on quality and cost are su¢ ciently hard to measure, public provision is still cheaper than
private provision for high levels of quality. Extending the model to allow for di⁄erences
in task attractiveness, I ￿nd that public ￿rms shun unattractive tasks, whereas private
￿rms undertake them if incentives are strong enough. Section 5 concludes the paper.
3See, for example, Donahue (1989), Wilson (1989), Domberger and Jensen (1997) and the references
cited in these works.
4As noted above, the paper by Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) do focus on quality.
32 The Model
The principal is a public agency that has to decide whether to procure a service from the
market or produce it in-house. The agent is a service provider. When service provision is
organized in-house, I refer to the service provider as the manager, with private provision,
the service provider is called owner.
A service provider can put e⁄ort on to two di⁄erent tasks. The ￿rst task (tq) improves
the quality of the service and the other (tc) reduces its costs. Engagement in the two tasks
entails a cost C (t) for the service provider, where t = tq + tc. The cost function, C (t), is
strictly convex, twice continuously di⁄erentiable and minimized at t￿ > 0, i.e., people are
assumed to exert some e⁄ort even in the absence of ￿nancial incentives. Unlike a recent
literature on the role of intrinsic motivation, or sense of mission, in public bureaucracies
or non-pro￿t organizations, I assume that there is no selection on agents￿type into private
or public ￿rms.5
The outcome of the cost reducing task is certain, but e⁄ort on cost reductions is not
observable to the public agency.6 The cost reduction is given by a function S(tc) which is
increasing, strictly concave and twice continuously di⁄erentiable in tc. Total cost is thus
decreasing in S(tc). In contrast to cost savings, the e⁄ort on quality is observable, albeit
imperfectly. Formally, the public agency receives a signal of quality q = tq + "q, where "q





. It is only possible to contract on
outcomes (q) and not directly on e⁄ort (tq).
The public agency￿ s valuation of service quality is described by a function B (tq; );
which is increasing and strictly concave in tq for all   > 0.   is a parameter that denotes
the public agency￿ s valuation of quality. I assume that B (tq; ) is twice continuously
di⁄erentiable in both tq and  , lim ￿!1 B (tq; ) = 1, Btq (tq;0) = 0 for all tq and
lim ￿!1 Btq (tq; ) = 1 for all tq, where Btq (tq; ) denotes the partial derivative of
B (tq; ) with respect to tq. The service provider￿ s utility is de￿ned as u(x) = ￿e￿rx,
where r is a measure of risk aversion and x is the ￿nancial return minus the cost of e⁄ort.
I assume that r > 0. The public agency is risk neutral.
The service provider receives a pecuniary compensation w(q) = ￿q + ￿ and a share
of cost savings ￿ 2 [0;1]. The parameter ￿ is thus a measure of the economic incentive
5See, for instance, Francois (2000); Glaeser and Shleifer (2001); and Besley and Ghatak (2005).
6I relax the assumption that e⁄ort on cost reductions is not contractible in Section 4.1.
4to engage in the quality improving task and ￿ is a ￿xed wage component. Similarly,
￿ denotes the incentive to reduce costs. We get x = w(q) + ￿S(tc) ￿ C (t) and the
manager/owner￿ s expected utility is thus
E [u(w(q) ￿ C (t) + ￿S (tc))] = u(CE),
where CE is the certainty equivalent. Solving for CE, we get









q￿2 is the agent￿ s risk premium. I refer to the product r￿2
q as the cost of risk.
As the risk premium is a convex function of the strength of incentives, we should not
expect risk to be an important consideration when incentives are low-powered.
The agent￿ s outside option is normalized to zero, implying that the participation con-
straint is CE ￿ 0. Assuming perfect competition, the ￿xed wage component ￿ will be
set such that the participation constraint always binds.
How do private and public ￿rms di⁄er in this model? The key assumption is that
the public agency cannot credibly commit to high-powered incentives, e.g., payment de-
pending on the completion of tasks or pro￿t sharing, under public (in-house) provision.
In terms of the model, this means that ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 0. The argument for this as-
sumption is that ownership gives control over key contractual parameters, which enlarges
the public agency￿ s scope for opportunistic behavior. For example, if the manager has a
share in the ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts, the owner could in￿ uence stated pro￿ts by changing accounting
procedures. Alternatively, the public agency could override the manager￿ s decisions in a
way that in￿ icts on his chances of reaching performance clauses. Another fundamental
commitment problem is the existence of the public ￿rm itself. If the public agency cannot
commit to not sell or close down the public ￿rm in the future, it is hard to commit to
incentives for outcomes that are observable only in the long run. This in turn a⁄ects the
optimal level of incentives for tasks that are observable in the short run as strong incen-
tives on such tasks will crowd out e⁄ort on tasks where outcomes are only observable in
the long run. Hence, the inability to commit to long-run incentives creates a problem of
intertemporal incentive balance. There are also some less fundamental reasons for why
it might be di¢ cult to provide managers of public ￿rms with strong incentives. In many
5countries, employment protection laws and union wage bargaining restrict the space of
feasible employment contracts. For example, it might more di¢ cult to ￿re an employee
should he deviate from the contractual terms than cease business with a private ￿rm.7
Private ￿rms have a stronger legal position toward the public agency in the sense that
it is harder for the public agency to manipulate contracts ex post. In addition, contracts
with private ￿rms are not constrained by employment regulations. However, even though
contractual compensation under private provision can be based on observable outcomes,
not every contract is credible ex ante. For example, if the re-tendering of contracts is
costly, public procurers may not be able to commit to cancel a contract in case of poor
performance. Relatedly, contracts that entail the bankrupcy of the ￿rm in some states of
the world might not be renegotiation-proof. Moreover, public procurement procedures are
often subject to regulations that aim to reduce the risk of collusion between bureaucrats
and ￿rms. As pointed out by Wilson (2000, p. 10 in the preface), such regulations make it
hard for the government purchaser to take past experience of a ￿rm into account, thereby
limiting the scope for implicit contracting on quality.8 In practice, high penalties might
not be enforcable buy a court.9
If high-powered incentives for quality provision are not credible ex ante, the set of
possible contracts is limited by some upper bound on ￿, i.e. ￿ 2 [0;￿].10 We can also
think of ￿ as a reduced form for contractual incompleteness. For simplicity, there is only
one dimension of quality in the model. In reality, service quality consists of a very large
number of distinct tasks, some of which might be impossible or too costly to put in a
contract.
Since e⁄ort on the cost reducing task is unobservable to the public agency and the
owner of the private ￿rm has the residual control rights, ￿ = 1 in case of private provision.
The assumption that cost savings are unobservable might seem stark and I will relax it in
an extension below. However, the assumption makes more sense if we include activities
7The public sector may of course rely on indirect means to provide public sector managers with
incentives, such as career concerns. When assuming weak incentives in the public sector, we are thus
implicitly assuming that public bureaucracies are not highly meritocratic.
8Dalen et al. (2006) develop a model where the prospect of contract renewal provides incentives
for private ￿rms to supply quality. They ￿nd that incentives for quality are maximized when 50 % of
contracts are renewed.
9One example of this is Italy, where the value of penalities cannot exceed 10 percent of the overall
contract value (see Albano et al., 2006).
10We also can think of ￿ as a reduced form of implicit contracting (such as relational contracting or
reputation e⁄ects), though the game played by principal and agent is not modelled explicitly.
6that a⁄ect the ￿rm￿ s cost structure over the long term in the de￿nition of cost savings. In
this case, a wide range of activities that might have a negative immediate impact on pro￿ts
would count as e⁄ort on cost reductions. Examples include many tasks which are hard to
contract on directly, such as equipment maintenance, the development of administrative
systems and human resource management. Such costs are also not easy to estimate from
accounting data. For example, consider a garbage collector. One of the costs of garbage
collection is that the value of the trucks used to collect the garbage is run down over time.
If the public agency owns the ￿rm, it just buys a new truck whenever the old trucks are
worn out and costs does not have to be measured. If the private ￿rm owns the trucks,
the trucks￿condition need to be evaluated to determine the true cost of collecting the
garbage over the contractual term. Such an evaluation is costly and arguably subject to
some measurement error.11
2.1 Public ￿rm
Since the public agency cannot commit to incentive payment schemes under public pro-
vision, ￿ and ￿ are equal to zero. The manager￿ s maximization problem is therefore12
max
tq;tc
￿ ￿ C (t). (1)
Since the agent is indi⁄erent between the two tasks he just minimizes his cost function
with respect to total e⁄ort.13 This gives the optimality condition tq + tc = t￿ where
C0(t￿) = 0. Since the manager is indi⁄erent between tasks I assume that he divides his
e⁄ort according to the wishes of the public agency.14 The public agency￿ s maximization
11A similar argument can be made in support of the assumption that it is hard to give public sector
managers strong incentives to save costs. The only time when an owner of a private ￿rm need to measure
the result of investments made to improve e¢ ciency is when he sells the ￿rm. In contrast, for a manager
of a public ￿rm to get the correct compensation, contracts need to specify exactly the contribution to
cost e¢ ciency made by the manager during a certain period of time.
12Note that since u(CE) is a monotone transformation of CE, maximizing CE is equivalent to maxi-
mizing u(CE) = E [u].
13The assumption that the manager is indi⁄erent between tasks is discussed in Section 4.2.
14I thus implicitly assume that the agent has lexicographic preferences where his ￿rst priority is to




B (tq; ) + S (tc)
s.t. tq + tc = t￿.
(2)













tq = 0 and tc = t￿ if Btq (0; ) ￿ S0(t￿);
￿
(tq;tc)jBtq (tq; ) = S0(tc)
￿
if Btq (0; ) > S0(t￿) and Btq (t￿; ) < S0(0);
tq = t￿ and tc = 0 if Btq (t￿; ) ￿ S0(0).
Hence, the manager of the public ￿rm sets the total level of e⁄ort and the public agency
decides how this e⁄ort should be divided between the two tasks. The public agency orders
the manager to set tq = 0 if the marginal value of quality at tq = 0 is weakly lower than
the marginal bene￿t of cost savings at tc = t￿. When the public agency￿ s valuation of
quality is higher, the manager is instructed to put e⁄ort on quality until the marginal
value of quality equals the marginal value of cost reductions. The second corner solution
occurs when the public agency￿ s marginal valuation of quality at tq = t￿ is weakly higher
than the marginal returns to cost savings at tc = 0. The division of e⁄ort between tasks
is therefore optimal under public provision, whereas total work e⁄ort is suboptimally low.
2.2 Private ￿rm
Since cost savings are unobservable and the owner of the private ￿rm is the residual
claimant to the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t, we have that ￿ = 1. The owner￿ s maximization problem is
max
tq;tc
￿tq + ￿ ￿ C (t) + S(tc) ￿ 1
2r￿2
q￿2. (3)













tq = 0 and tc = t s.t. S0(t) = C0 (t) if 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ S0(t);
f(tq;tc)j￿ = S0(tc) = C0 (t)g if S0(t) < ￿ < S0(0);
tq s.t. ￿ = C0 (t) and tc = 0 if ￿ ￿ S0(0).
8In the interior solution, I get to, to
q and to
























In the ￿rst corner solution, t, tq and tc are una⁄ected by ￿. Accordingly, for 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ S0 (t)
we have that to
q (￿) = 0 and to (￿) = to
c (￿) = t. Hence, if incentives for quality provision
are weak, the agent only puts e⁄ort into reducing costs and total work e⁄ort is low,
though still higher than under public provision. As the incentive for quality provision gets
stronger, the owner increases total e⁄ort and reduces e⁄ort on cost reductions, implying
that e⁄ort on quality increases. If incentives for quality provision are very strong, the
owner of the private ￿rm only puts e⁄ort into increasing quality. In addition to its e⁄ect
on e⁄ort choice, ￿ also a⁄ects the agent￿ s risk-premium, given that there is uncertainty
in the signal q (i.e. ￿2











q (￿) + ￿
￿
s.t. ￿ ￿ ￿;
CE ￿ 0.
Since the ￿xed wage component ￿ is set to satisfy the owner￿ s participation constraint,







￿ C (to (￿)) + S (to
c (￿)) ￿ 1
2r￿2
q￿2
s.t. ￿ ￿ ￿.
(4)
In the interior solution, we get the ￿rst-order condition
￿
￿ =
Btq (tq; )[1=C00 (t) ￿ 1=S00 (tc)]
￿
1=C00 (t) ￿ 1=S00 (tc) + r￿2
q
￿ ;









Though condition (5) seems to imply that the higher is the cost of risk, the lower is the
15It is shown in the Appendix that to, to
q and to
c are continuous functions of ￿.
16I show this in the Appendix.
9strength of incentives for quality provision, a positive cost of risk also implies that the
public agency￿ s maximization problem need not be concave in ￿, and that there might
be more than one interior solution.17 Let W (￿) denote the public agency￿ s valuation of









￿￿￿ = argmax￿2A W (￿) where A is the set of feasible interior solutions.18 To ￿nd the
optimal contract, we have to compare the surplus under the corner solutions ￿ = 0 and





0 if W (0) ￿ maxfW (￿￿￿);W (￿)g;
￿￿￿ if W (￿￿￿) ￿ maxfW (0);W (￿)g;
￿ if W (￿) ￿ maxfW (￿￿￿);W (0)g.
3 Results
The highest possible level of quality from a public ￿rm is simply tm
q = t￿. In that case, the
public agency orders the manager of the public ￿rm to spend all his e⁄orts on increasing
quality. How high quality can be obtained from a private ￿rm depends on the set of
feasible incentives. In the one extreme, if the owner of the private ￿rm can only be
provided with weak incentives to invest in quality (￿ ￿ S0 (t)), it is not possible to induce
the private ￿rm to invest in quality at all. Yet if strong incentives on quality provision
are feasible (that is, if ￿ is high), the maximum feasible level of quality from a private
￿rm exceeds that of a public ￿rm.
Proposition 1 If strong incentives are feasible, in the sense that the permissible incentive
intensity ￿ exceeds some ￿nite threshold level b ￿, a private ￿rm can be induced to produce
a higher quality than the public ￿rm. If ￿ instead falls short of b ￿, a private ￿rm cannot
be induced to produce as high quality as a public ￿rm.
Proofs are provided in the Appendix.
17Non-concavity could be ruled out by assuming that C000(t) ￿ 0 and S000 (tc) ￿ 0. This is shown in the
Appendix.
18The set of feasible interior solutions might be empty.
19W (￿) is a continuous function since all the arguments are continuous in ￿ (as shown in the proof to
Proposition 1). As the derivatives of both tq and tc are zero for ￿ < S0(t), it follows that the derivative of
W (￿) is negative for all ￿ < S0(t). Hence, whenever the public agency￿ s optimal solution implies tq = 0,
we have ￿ = 0.
10The result that private ￿rms can have either higher or lower quality depending on
the economic environment is also present in Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997), but their
argument is di⁄erent from mine. In their paper, the di⁄erence in quality depends on
the relative importance of the quality-enhancing innovation and the negative e⁄ect on
quality of cost reductions, whereas in my case it depends on the set of feasible incentives.
Moreover, the di⁄erence between private and public production in Proposition 1 only
refers to the maximum level of quality; whether a potential di⁄erence is realized hinges
on the ￿ set by the public agency. Let us now focus on di⁄erences in cost.
First, note that private provision is always cheaper than public provision for the lowest
level of quality, tq = 0. In that case, the manager of the public ￿rm sets tm
c = t￿ and
total cost is C (t￿) ￿ S (t￿). Since C0(t￿) = 0 < S0(t￿), this is clearly a suboptimally low
level of e⁄ort. In contrast, the owner of the private ￿rm is the residual claimant to cost
savings and sets to
c = t > t￿ which is the e¢ cient level of e⁄ort. Moreover, the marginal
cost for the public agency to increase quality is always lower under private provision than





is su¢ ciently small. To see this, note
that for any given value of tq we have that to
c > tm
c which by strict concavity of the cost-
saving function implies that S0 (to
c) < S0 (tm
c ). The cost of additional quality in terms of
forgone cost savings is thus always larger for public than for private ￿rms. However, the
cost advantage of private provision vanishes for high levels of quality when the cost of
risk is high. Since the public agency must increase ￿ to induce the private ￿rm to exert





rises with the level of quality. For
high enough values of r￿2
q, the marginal cost of quality is therefore higher under private
provision than under public provision for any feasible level of quality. There is also a
￿xed cost of going from zero to positive levels of quality under private provision. For
0 < ￿ ￿ S0 (t), the owner of the private ￿rm do not increase e⁄ort on tq as ￿ increases,
but costs increase due to the higher the risk premium. Since private ￿rms are always
cheaper for zero quality, private provision is cheaper than public ￿rms for low levels of
quality, but more expensive for high levels of quality when r￿2
q is high.20
Proposition 2 There is a cost of risk c r￿
2
q such that private ￿rms are cheaper for no
e⁄ort on quality, but more expensive for all levels of quality above a ￿nite threshold b tq. If
b tq > 0, private ￿rms are cheaper for all quality levels below b tq.
20Note that, in the extreme case, "low levels of quality" refers to tq = 0.
11Figure 1 gives two parametric examples with di⁄erent levels of cost of risk. In the
￿rst case, we set r￿2
q = 0 and private provision is cheaper for all levels of e⁄ort on
quality and the di⁄erence is increasing in the level of quality. The cost for no e⁄ort on






a discontinuous jump when quality is increased above zero. The reason for this is that
the strength of incentives for quality provision must be increased from ￿ = 0 to ￿ =
S0(t) + ￿, where ￿ is some very small number larger than zero. In this particular case,
costs are similar under public and private provision for medium levels of quality, but
private provision is more expensive for high levels of quality. However, the highest levels
of quality can only be obtained from a private ￿rm. If we were to increase the cost of
risk even higher, we would eventually reach the case where private provision is cheaper
for zero e⁄ort on quality, but more expensive for all positive levels of quality.
[FIGURE 1]
Now, let us discuss the public agency￿ s choice of ownership structure. Assuming that
strong incentives are feasible, whether the service will be bought from a private or a public
￿rm depends on the public agency￿ s willingness to pay for quality,  , and the cost of risk,
r￿2
q. If either   or r￿2
q are low, private provision will be superior since it is cheapest.
Conversely, if the public agency has a high valuation of quality and r￿2
q is high, a rational
public agency prefers public provision since the risk premium makes private provision
more expensive for high levels of quality. However, since it is not possible to extract
quality in excess of t￿
q from public ￿rms, private provision is better if the public agency￿ s
willingness to pay for quality is very high. There is thus a potential non-monotonicity
regarding the choice of ownership structure in government preference for quality.
Proposition 3 If the upper bound of contractibility on quality, ￿, is such that an e⁄ort
on quality exceeding t￿
q can be extracted from private ￿rms, private provision is superior if
quality is either considered unimportant or very important, and if r￿2
q is su¢ ciently large
there exists some intermediate level of the importance of quality such that public provision
is superior.
If strong incentives are not feasible, the only advantage of private provision is its lower
cost for low levels of quality.
12Proposition 4 If the upper bound of contractibility on quality, ￿, is such that the maxi-
mum level of quality under private provision is below t￿
q, public provision is superior when
quality is important.
To summarize, we have two cases where public ownership may be superior to private
ownership, namely: i) when weak feasible incentives for e⁄ort on quality make private
provision above a certain quality level impossible, and ii) when the di¢ culty in measuring
quality makes private ￿rms more expensive for high levels of quality.
The model predicts that privatization will reduce costs without any deteriation of
quality for services where quality is easy to measure. This prediction ￿ts well with the
large amount of empirical studies that ￿nd signi￿cant cost reductions from privatization of
services like garbage collection or cleaning services.21 Even a critic of privatization such
as Elliot Sclar (2000) argues that "privatization of many blue-collar services certainly
may be cost e⁄ective" (p. 57).22 In contrast, privatization has not been shown to cut
costs signi￿cantly in hospital care.23 This is in line with the model￿ s predictions under
the assumptions that quality is important but hard to measure.24 The thrust of the
argument is similar if there are costs other than risk associated with providing incentives
for quality. For example, there might be signi￿cant costs associated with formulating
adequate contracts on quality in hospital care.25
The model also illustrates the importance of controlling for market selection in em-
pirical studies of privatization. For services where quality is hard to measure, only public
agencies with a low (or very high) valuation of quality will go for private provision.
Hence, unless quality is adequately controlled for, empirical studies are likely to overstate
21See, for example, Donahue (1989), Wilson (1989), Hilke (1992), Domberger and Jensen (1997), and
the references cited in these works.
22A contrasting view is Ohlsson (2003), who argues that much of the literature on refuse collection has
overstated the cost saving e⁄ect of privatization due to a failure to control for selection bias.
23See references in Wilson (1989), Hilke (1992), and Currie et al (2003).
24See Preker et al. (2000) and Preker and Harding (2000) for an argument that it is di¢ cult to
measure performance in the health care sector. In the survey of city managers reported in Levin and
Tadelis (2007), emergency hospital care rank as number seven in contracting di¢ culty and number one
in resident sensitivity to quality of thirty di⁄erent services.
25Another aspect of privatization in health care is many health care services are credence goods, i.e.,
producers have private information on the quantity and quality that it would be optimal for the buyer
to buy. Privatization may therefore also increase cost through overtreatment of patients or by charging
for treatment not undertaken. See Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) for an overview of the theoretical
research on credence goods and Silverman and Skinner (2004) and Sloan et al. (2001) for empirical studies
that focus on privatization and the credence good aspect of hospital care.
13the cost-saving e⁄ect of private provision.26 Empirical evidence supports the selection
of services for privatization implied by the model. In a comprehensive study on service
contracting in American cities, Levin and Tadelis (2007) ￿nd that services for which it
is harder to write and administer performance contracts are less likely to be privatized.
Further, services that city managers rank lower in terms of resident sensitivity to quality
are more likely to be privatized.
The result that privatization is bene￿cial due to lower cost when quality is not im-
portant is also present in Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997). However, when quality is
important, the model in Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) predicts that privatization is
bene￿cial when there is a large scope for non-contractible quality improvements and non-
contractible cost reductions have a little e⁄ect on quality. Hence, unlike my model, their
model does not give a clear prediction whether services for which it is hard to contract
on quality will be more or less likely to be privatized.
Another reason why privatization might not save costs is that agency problems within
private ￿rms make the incentives for top executives similar to those of public managers. If
a ￿rm owner that hires a manager to run his business faces the same commitment problem
as the government, privatization does not change anything in the context of this model.27
Hence, privatization might have its largest impact when private ￿rms are relatively small
and owner-led and economic models focusing on the impact of ownership (like this paper)
might only be applicable to a subset of privatization cases. Relatedly, an implication
of this model is that privatization works better when capital markets function well and
owners are able to diversify risks.
Finally, let us brie￿ y consider the di⁄erences between contracting out in the private
and public sector. One might argue that the problem of providing managers with strong
incentives is worse in the public than in the private sector, since the latter can rely on the
information given by stock prices. This would imply that contracting out is particularly
important in the public sector. However, there are also reasons for why contracting could
be more di¢ cult in the public sector. For example, procurement laws might make implicit
contracting through repeated interaction harder and contracts with private providers are
often in practice enforced by government bureaucrats with weak incentives to do a good
26Of course, the opposite case would hold if many public agency￿ s have a very strong preference for
quality and high-powered incentives for quality are feasible.
27Note that low incentives to reduce costs will imply less of an incentive balance problem, making it
easier for the government to induce private ￿rms not to shirk on quality provision.
14job.
4 Extensions
4.1 Contracting on cost
So far, I have analyzed the case where it is only possible to contract on quality. Here I
relax this assumption and let the public agency and the private ￿rm contract on cost.28
As we will see, because of the residual risk, it is not possible to replicate the public ￿rm
even under full contractibility on quality and cost.
Under no cost contracting, the owner of the ￿rm is the residual claimant to cost
savings and ￿ = 1. Hence, cost contracting implies that the ￿rm and the government
sign a contract that gives the private ￿rm less than the full share of cost savings, in e⁄ect
a cost-plus contract where the ￿rm gets compensation for costs incurred.29 Accordingly,
complete cost-plus contracting corresponds to ￿ = 0. The cost contracting problem is
thus not to provide private ￿rms with strong incentives to cut costs, but to mitigate
those incentives, and the commitment problem is to make a high degree of compensation
credible. In terms of our model, the lower is tc, the larger is the compensation from the
government to the private ￿rm.
Let ￿ = 1￿ ￿ denote the share of costs for which the owner is compensated. I assume
that ￿ 2 [0;1], though in principle there might be some upper bound on contractibility
on cost ￿ 2 [0;1] so that ￿ 2 [0;￿]. The principal receives a signal of costs v = S (tc)+"v
where "v ￿ N (0;￿2
v) and the agent￿ s compensation is w(q;v) = ￿q + ￿ ￿ ￿v. I assume
that the errors in q and v are independent, i.e., Cov ("q;"v) = 0. The owner￿ s monetary
payo⁄, x, is then normally distributed with E (x) = ￿tq + ￿ ￿ C (t) + (1 ￿ ￿)S (tc) and
V (x) = ￿2
q￿2 + ￿2
v￿2. This gives us the owner￿ s maximization problem
max
tq;tc













28I keep the assumption that no contract on the completion of tasks is possible under public provision.
29I assume that it is not possible for the owner of the private ￿rm to extract revenue by increasing
costs, for example by increasing his own wage.
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In the interior solution (excluding the case when ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 1), we get to, to
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and the ￿rst-order condition with respect to ￿;
￿
￿ =







As above, the maximization problem is not necessarily concave in ￿ and ￿.
The basic insight from this extension of the model is that the level of incentives
for quality provision (￿) needed to ensure a certain level of quality (tq) is falling in
30This is shown in the Appendix.
16the extent of cost-plus contracting (￿). By compensating the owner of the ￿rm for his
costs, incentives to invest in cost reductions are muted, implying that e⁄ort on the cost
reducing task falls, which makes the cost of e⁄ort for engaging in quality provision lower
on the margin.31 Hence, by lowering the incentives for cost reductions, a higher level of
quality can be exerted for any given level of incentives for quality provision. This has
two potential advantages: First, it mitigates the problem of weak feasible incentives for
quality provision. Second, for a given level of quality, incentives for quality can be less
high-powered, thereby lowering the cost of risk.32
Note that setting ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 1 gives the owner of the private ￿rm exactly the
same incentives as the manager of the public ￿rm. However, if r￿2
v > 0, the owner of the
private ￿rm have to bear risk, making private provision more expensive. Hence, ownership
matters also when a private ￿rm can be provided with exactly the same incentives as a
public ￿rm. Actually, even if contracts are complete (in the sense that ￿ = 1 and ￿ = 1),
public provision is still cheaper than private provision for high levels of quality if r￿2
q and
r￿2
v are high enough.








such that public ￿rms are cheaper than private ￿rms.
4.2 Task attractiveness
A key result of the model is that private ￿rms underinvest in tasks for which they have
no ￿nancial incentives, whereas the drawback of public provision is the low level of total
e⁄ort. This is in accordance with previous models of privatization like Schmidt (1996)
and Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997). An implicit assumption in these models, as well as
my model, is that tasks do not di⁄er in terms of their inherent attractiveness. Yet if some
tasks are inherently less attractive than others (for example because they are boring or
di¢ cult to undertake), the incentive balance problem might be reversed. The manager of
a public ￿rm, who lacks ￿nancial incentives for any particular task, underinvests in those
tasks that he or she for some reason ￿nds unattractive. The owner of the private ￿rm
31As long as ￿ > (1 ￿ ￿)S0(t), total e⁄ort is determined by ￿, and ￿ does only determine the allocation
across tasks ￿the higher is ￿, the larger must S0(tc) be for a given ￿, implying that tc is falling in ￿.
For 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)S0(t), total e⁄ort is determined solely by ￿, but then there￿ s no rationale for setting
￿ > 0, except for eliminating all incentives for cost reductions by setting ￿ = 1
32Conditions under which the principal will set ￿ > 0 are provided in the Appendix.
17also dislikes the unattractive task, but this is at least partly o⁄set by an explicit ￿nancial
incentive.
Let tu denote e⁄ort on the unattractive task. I assume that tu, tq and tc are perfect
substitutes in the cost of e⁄ort, i.e., t = tu+ tq+tc. E⁄ort on tu also comes at an additional
cost of e⁄ort D(tu), which is an increasing and strictly convex function with D0 (0) > 0.
I assume that e⁄ort on tu is perfectly observable and hence contractible in case of private
provision. The owner of the private ￿rm is compensated according to the linear wage
contract
w(q) = ￿q + !tu + ￿:
The owner￿ s maximization problem then becomes
max
tq, tc, tu
￿tq + !tu + ￿ + S(tc) ￿ C (t) ￿ D(tu) ￿ 1
2r￿2
q￿2: (9)
Solving this problem, we ￿nd that the owner of the private ￿rm will put e⁄ort on the
unattractive task if ! > D0 (0) + maxf￿;S0(t)g. Note that e⁄ort on cost reductions and
quality are both crowded out by strong incentives for the unattractive task.
Since the public agency cannot commit to any incentive scheme under public provision,
we have ￿ = 0 and ! = 0, implying that the public manager￿ s maximization problem is
max
tq;tc;tu
￿ ￿ C (t) ￿ D(tu). (10)
Hence, under public provision, the manager sets tu = 0 and tq + tc = t￿. Note that I
implicitly assume that the government cannot restrict the work description of the public
￿rm to only include tu, in which case the task allocation problem might be overcome.33 By
the same argument, di⁄erences in task attractiveness also provides a rationale for limiting
worker freedom within organizations.
Proposition 6 Public ￿rms shun unattractive tasks, but private ￿rms undertake them if
incentives are strong enough.
33For the manager of the public ￿rm to set tu > 0, we must have that jC0 (0)j > D0 (0). Note that if
tu is not an argument in C (t) (that is, the cost of e⁄ort on tq and tc are independent of tu), then the
manager of the public ￿rm will always set tu = 0.
18Instead of an additional unattractive task, we could consider the relative task attrac-
tiveness of tq and tc. For example, it is conceivable that improving quality is a more
attractive task than reducing costs. If so, it would not be possible to induce a manager
of a public ￿rm to put e⁄ort on cost reductions. This is an important caveat to the
assumption above that the manager of the public ￿rm is indi⁄erent between improving
quality and reducing costs.
Just as public providers are likely to avoid unattractive tasks, they will choose to
undertake any task which seems particularly attractive. For example, a manager in a
public ￿rm might focus unduly on activities that are ￿in vogue￿ , even if they are not
central to the mandate of the ￿rm. This observation suggests that it is important not to
give managers of public ￿rms a too wide mandate.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has argued that di⁄erences in ex ante contracts is an important feature of
privatization of service provision. Under private provision, procurement agencies write
elaborate contracts with private ￿rms, whereas managers under in-house provision seldom
have explicit incentive contracts. The focus on ex ante contracts gives a di⁄erent result
regarding the cost e¢ ciency of private production compared to previous theory. Priva-
tization typically increases the incentives to cut costs, implying that private ￿rms need
to be given incentives not to shirk on quality. In this paper, I have considered one cost
of such incentives: if quality cannot be measured perfectly, high-powered incentives for
quality imply that the private ￿rm will be exposed to risk, thereby increasing costs for
high levels of quality. However, the basic argument that privatization may increase cost
for high levels of quality remains intact if we instead consider some other type of cost, like
contractual rents due to limited liability or the cost of writing contracts and monitoring
performance.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Owner￿ s e⁄ort choice
7.1.1 Without contracting on costs
Consider the owner￿ s e⁄ort on cost reductions as a function of ￿. From the solution to
(3), we know that to
c (￿) = t > t￿ for 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ S0 (t) and to
c (￿) = 0 for all ￿ ￿ S0 (0). Since
S(tc) is increasing and strictly concave, there exists an inverse function to ￿ = S0(tc) for
0 < tc < t. As S(tc) is also twice continuously di⁄erentiable, the inverse function to
c (￿) is
continuously decreasing in ￿ for S0 (t) < ￿ < S0 (0). Now consider the owner￿ s total e⁄ort
as a function of ￿. From the solution to (3), we know that to
q (￿) = 0 for 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ S0 (t)
and so to (￿) = to
c (￿) = t for 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ S0 (t). Since C (t) is strictly convex and increasing
for t > t￿, ￿ = C0 (t) is invertible for t < t < t where t is such that limt!t C0(t) = 1. As
C(t) is also twice continuously di⁄erentiable, the inverse function to (￿) is continuously
increasing in ￿ for ￿ > S0 (t) = C0 (t) with lim￿!1 to (￿) = t. The owner￿ s e⁄ort on
quality is given by to
q (￿) = to (￿) ￿ to
c (￿). It follows from above that to
q (￿) = 0 for
0 ￿ ￿ ￿ S0 (t) and that to
q (￿) is continuously increasing in ￿ for all ￿ > S0 (t) = C0 (t)
with lim￿!1 to
q (￿) = t.
7.1.2 With contracting on costs
For ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 1, the owner of the ￿rm is indi⁄erent between tq and tc and all
allocations of e⁄ort such that tq + tc = t￿ are feasible. However, as soon as ￿ > 0 and
￿ = 1, the owner will set tc = 0 or, alternatively, when ￿ = 0 and ￿ < 1, the owner will
set tq = 0. Hence, to
q (￿;￿) and to
c (￿;￿) are not necessarily continuous in ￿ and ￿ when
￿ = 0 and ￿ = 1.
22From the solution to (6), it follows that for ￿ < 1, to (￿;￿), to
c (￿;￿) and to
q (￿;￿) are
continuous in ￿ by the same argument as in the case without contracting on costs (to see
this, just replace ￿ by ￿=(1 ￿ ￿) in the optimality conditions). For ￿ = 1; to (￿;￿) and
to
q (￿;￿) are continuously increasing in ￿.
From the solution to (6), we see that tq = 0 for 0 ￿ ￿
1￿￿ ￿ S0(t), to
c (￿;￿) = 0 for
￿
1￿￿ ￿ S0(0) and that to (￿;￿) is independent of ￿ for ￿
1￿￿ > S0 (t). Since S(tc) is increasing
and strictly concave, there exists an inverse function to ￿
1￿￿ = S0(tc) for 0 < tc < t. As
S(tc) is also twice continuously di⁄erentiable, the inverse function to
c (￿;￿) is continuously
decreasing in ￿
1￿￿ for S0 (t) < ￿
1￿￿ < S0 (0) and hence continuously decreasing in ￿ for
￿xed ￿. It follows that to
q (￿;￿) = to (￿;￿) ￿ to
c (￿;￿) is continuously increasing in ￿ for
S0 (t) < ￿
1￿￿ < S0 (0) and independent of ￿ for 0 ￿ ￿
1￿￿ ￿ S0(t) and ￿
1￿￿ ￿ S0(0).
7.2 The public agency￿ s maximization problem












s.t. ￿ ￿ ￿;
CE ￿ 0.








￿ (￿tq + ￿)
s.t. ￿ ￿ ￿;
CE ￿ 0.
(11)
The ￿xed wage ￿ is set just to let the participation constraint bind, i.e., so that CE = 0.
Reformulating the CE, we get
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￿ C (to (￿)) + S (to
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2r￿2
q￿2
s.t. ￿ ￿ ￿.
7.2.1 First and second derivatives
Without contracting on cost The ￿rst derivative of the public agency￿ s maximization



































The second derivative with respect to ￿ becomes
@2W (￿)
@￿2 = Btq;tq (tq; )
h
[1=C




































which can be either larger or smaller than zero. The second derivative is negative for
certain if Btq (tq; ) = S0 (tc) = C0 (t) (which is the case if r￿2
q = 0) or if C000(t) ￿ 0 and
S000 (tc) ￿ 0.
With contracting on cost The ￿rst derivative of the public agency￿ s maximization























































































which is negative for certain if Btq (tq; ) = S0 (tc) = C0 (t) or if C000(t) ￿ 0 and S000 (tc) ￿ 0.
The ￿rst derivative of the public agency￿ s maximization problem with respect to ￿ is
@W (￿;￿)
@￿
















This derivative is positive for ￿ = 0 whenever Btq (tq; ) > S0 (tc).
For the public agency to set ￿ > 0 it must either be the case that the cost of risk
is positive or that strong incentives for quality are infeasible. To see this, suppose that
we restict ￿ to zero. The public agency￿ s problem is then exactly the same as without
contracting on cost. Further, suppose that quality is so important that the solution to the
public agency￿ s problem is such that tq > 0 and that the incentive feasibility constraint
￿ does not bind. Then if r￿2
q > 0, we see from (7) that ￿ = S0 (tc) < Btq (tq; ) and so
￿ = 0 cannot be optimal. Similarly, ￿ will be strictly above zero if strong incentives for
quality provision are not feasible, i.e., if Btq (tq (￿;0); ) > S0 (tc (￿;0)), but quality is so
important that tq (￿;0) is preferred over tq = 0.
Before we consider the second derivative of the public agency￿ s maximization problem























































Using this, we can write the second derivative of the owner￿ s maximization problem with




































Note that it can never be optimal to set (￿;￿) such that S0 (tc) > Btq (tq; ), since the
public agency then can achieve both a better allocation of the agents e⁄ort and reduce
the cost of risk by reducing ￿ or ￿. Since Btq (tq; ) ￿ S0 (tc), a su¢ cient condition for
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26Since the cross-partial is not zero, it is a nontrivial exercise to derive conditions under
which the Hessian matrix is negative de￿nite. As it is not important for any of the results
presented in the paper, I abstain from deriving these conditions here.
7.3 Proofs
7.3.1 Proof of Proposition 1
From (1), we know that the maximum level of quality under public provision is tm
q = t￿.
Since t > t￿, there exists some S0 (t) < b ￿ < 1 by continuity of to
q (￿) such that to
q (b ￿) = t￿,
to
q (￿) < t￿ for all ￿ < b ￿ and to
q (￿) > t￿ for all ￿ > b ￿.
7.3.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Consider the function to
q (￿) from the owner￿ s e⁄ort choice above. As to
q (￿) is continuously






q > 0 which is
continuously increasing in to
q. From the solution to (4) we also know that ￿(0) = 0. Total
costs for a given level of quality under private provision is then given by
Ko (￿(tq)) = C (t















, C (t) and S (tc) are continuous functions for tq > 0, Ko (￿(tq))
is a continuous function of tq for tq > 0:
Total costs under public provision is given by
Km (tq) = C (t
￿) ￿ S (t
￿ ￿ tq)
for 0 ￿ tq ￿ t￿
q, which is a continuous function by continuity of S (tc). First, consider the
cost for no e⁄ort on quality. In case of private provision, we get
Ko (0) = C (t
o (0)) ￿ S (t
o
c (0))
= C (t) ￿ S (t)
which is the amount of e⁄ort that minimizes K. Since t￿ is such that C (t￿) = 0 < S (t￿),
27it follows that
Ko (0) < Km (0).








































Since C (to (￿(tq)))￿S (to





> 0 for to









= 1 for all to
q > 0. In contrast, total costs under public
provision is given by
Km (tq) = C (t
￿) ￿ S (t
￿ ￿ tq)
which is a ￿nite number for all tq ￿ t￿
q. By continuity of Ko (￿(tq)) and Km (tq) for tq > 0,
there exists a ￿nite value c r￿
2
q for all 0 < tq ￿ t￿
q such that, K (tq)o > K (tq)m whenever
r￿2
q > c r￿
2
q.























































q > f r￿
2
q.









such that private provision is
cheaper for zero e⁄ort on quality but more expensive for e⁄ort on quality above some
￿nite threshold tq < t￿
q. As marginal cost is higher under private provision for tq > 0,
costs can be the same for at most one level of e⁄ort on quality.
7.3.3 Proof of Proposition 3





￿Ko (0) is a ￿nite number
and B (tq; ) is continuous in   with lim !1 B (tq; ) = 1, there always exists some ￿nite










> B (0; ) ￿ Ko (0) for all   > e  . That is, if quality is
su¢ ciently important, the optimal level of quality from public provision is superior to zero
quality from a private ￿rm. We know from Proposition 2 that limr￿2
q!1 Ko (tq) = 1 for
all to
q > 0. It follows that the surplus under private provision approaches B (0; )￿Ko (0)
from above when r￿2
q goes to in￿nity. Hence, for all   > e  , there also exists a ￿nite cost of
risk c r￿
2
q ( ) such that public provision is preferred to private provision for r￿2
q > c r￿
2
q ( ).
Second, consider the case when quality is unimportant (  = 0). Since Btq (tq;0) = 0
for all tq we get from the solutions to (2) and (4) that the optimal level of tq is equal
to zero both under private and public provision. From Proposition 2, we know that
Ko (0) < Km (0), and so private provision is superior.
Before we consider the case when quality is very important, we establish that there
exists some ￿nite   such that the public agency will set ￿ so that to
q (￿) > t￿ ￿ tm
q .





is a ￿nite number for any tq < t, there exists for
all 0 < tq < t some ￿nite value of   such that B (tq; ) ￿ Ko (tq) > B (0; ) ￿ Ko (0).
We can therefore rule out the corner solution ￿ = 0. Since lim !1 Btq (tq; ) = 1, we
get from (5) that lim !1 ￿￿ = 1. As lim￿!1 to
q (￿) = t, we have that lim !1 to
q =











is a ￿nite number, lim !1 Btq (tq; ) = 1 for all tq > 0 and
lim !1 to
q = t > t￿ ￿ tm


























for all   > b  .
Now, suppose that r￿2
q > c r￿
2
q ( ) for some   > e  . We know from above that private





and that there exists some   above e   but





such that public provision is superior.
297.3.4 Proof of Proposition 4
We know from Proposition 1 that there exists an b ￿ such that to
q (￿) < t￿
q if ￿ < b ￿. Since
lim !1 Btq (tq; ) = 1 and tm
q = t￿ if Btq (tq; ) ￿ S0 (0), there exists a ￿nite e   such that
tm
q > to










is ￿nite and lim !1 Btq (tq; ) = 1


















for all   > b  .
7.3.5 Proof of Proposition 5
For any feasible level of e⁄ort on quality, there is some nonempty set of parameter values
(￿;￿) that induces the private ￿rm to put down this particular level of e⁄ort (the particular
parameter values that minimize costs for a certain level of quality will vary depending
on r￿2
q and r￿2
v). Let ￿(tq) and ￿ (tq) denote the values of the incentive parameters that
minimize total cost to the public agency for a certain level of tq. Then, total cost for a
given level of quality is
K (tq) = C (t
o (￿(tq);￿ (tq))) ￿ S (t
o













Note that (￿;￿) = (0;0) is the only optimal solution for tq = 0. We therefore get the
same result as in Proposition 2 regarding cost for zero e⁄ort on quality, i.e., Ko (0;0) =
K (0)o < K (0)m.
Second, for any tq > 0, we must have that either ￿ and ￿ or both are strictly larger
than zero. Since C (to (￿))￿S (to
c (￿;￿)) is ￿nite, costs approach in￿nity for the whole set
of parameter values that give a certain tq (including the set that minimize costs) when
both r￿2
q and r￿2
v approach in￿nity. Hence, we have that limr￿2
q!1;r￿2
v!1 Ko (tq) = 1
for all feasible tq > 0. Since costs are continuously increasing in r￿2
q and r￿2
v for all
combinations of ￿ and ￿ that give a certain level of quality, Ko (tq) is a continuous
function of r￿2
q and r￿2
v and there always exists a pair of ￿nite values of r￿2
q and r￿2
v
such that Ko (tq) > Km (tq) for any tq 2 (0;t￿]:
7.3.6 Proof of Proposition 6
Since D0 (tu) > 0 for all tu > 0, tu = 0 and tq + tc = t￿ solves the manager￿ s problem
(10). In case of private provision (9), the ￿rst-order condition with respect to tu is
30! ￿ D0 (tu) ￿ C0 (t). Since C0 (t) = maxf￿;S0(t)g the owner will set tu > 0 if and only if
! > D0 (0) + maxf￿;S0(t)g.
7.4 Numerical example
Assume the functional forms
C (t) = (t ￿ 2)
8;
S (tc) = 5log(tc + 1);
which give
C



















= 8(t ￿ 2)
7;
t = 2:7735:
and so the highest level of ￿ for which to
q (￿) = 0 is
￿ = 8(2:7735 ￿ 2)
7 = 1:3253.



































0 (tc) = 5
we have tc = 0, but this point is never reached in the cases I simulated.
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